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MARKET FAILURES AND THE
EVOLUTION OF STATE REGULATION
OF MANAGED CARE
FRANK A. SLOAN* AND MARK A. HALL**
I
INTRODUCTION
States have enacted numerous statutes in response to widespread dissatis-
faction with managed care, which was exacerbated by its growth during the
1990s.  Known as managed care patient care laws, the statutes address concerns
of consumers and medical care providers.  Organized medicine, a very effective
political force, harnessed consumer dissatisfaction.1  Accordingly, the first wave
of laws, prior to the mid-1990s, was primarily the result of lobbying by physi-
cians and focused on “any-willing-provider” laws and laws requiring the inclu-
sion of certain types of providers (such as dermatologists, chiropractors, and
acupuncturists) in managed care networks.2  Starting in 1995 and 1996, states
began to enact laws to address consumer concerns.3
Hundreds of managed care laws have been enacted.  Statutory changes were
made to existing laws designed to address insurer insolvency4 and quality of
care.5  The laws include (in various combinations):6  (1) liability and appeal
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1. See Richard Sorian & Judith Feder, Why We Need a Patient’s Bill of Rights, 24 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 1137, 1139 (1999).
2. Jill A. Marsteller et al., The Resurgence of Selective Contracting Restrictions, 22 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 1133, 1137 (1997).
3. Tracy E. Miller, Managed Care Regulations: In the Laboratory of the States, 278 JAMA 1102
(1997); Alice A. Noble & Troyen A. Brennan, The Stages of Managed Care Regulation: Developing
Better Rules, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1275, 1281-83 (1999); Sorian & Feder, supra note 1, at
1140.
4. See Henry T. Greely, The Regulation of Private Health Insurance, in HEALTH CARE
CORPORATE LAW: FORMATION AND REGULATION (Mark A. Hall ed., 1999).
5. See Troyen A. Brennan, The Role of Regulation in Quality Improvement, 76 MILBANK Q. 709
(1998).
6. For a description and categorization of these laws using a similar, but contrasting, scheme, see
JILL A. MARSTELLER & RANDALL R. BOVBJERG, URBAN INST., FEDERALISM AND PATIENT
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provisions—the right to an external review of coverage denials and the right to
bring a tort suit against a health plan; (2) provisions affecting choice of and
access to providers, such as “any-willing-provider” laws, point-of-service
options, and direct access to specialists; (3) protecting providers from undue
influence, such as by limiting physician incentives, banning “gag clauses,” and
giving providers due process rights when they are terminated from a plan; and
(4) provisions governing general coverage standards (medical necessity and
emergency care) and specific coverage mandates, such as minimum maternity
stays.
Sources of dissatisfaction with managed care are well-documented.7
Although most consumers are satisfied with their actual experiences with
managed care plans, and the observable quality of care remains high,8 the public
has a generalized concern that managed care plans will lower quality of care, in
part by restricting access to beneficial care in an effort to save money for the
plan.9  Such restrictions are thought to take a variety of forms, including
restrictions on access to emergency room care, to specialists, and to other costly
care that may potentially be beneficial to the plan enrollee.  To the extent that
real savings are generated, many consumers and physicians believe that such
savings accrue to equity holders of the plans’ corporate sponsors rather than to
reduced premiums for customers.10  Patients’ reactions to managed care
strategies, such as gatekeeping, preauthorization of referrals, and financial
incentives for physicians depend in part on whether they are construed to
improve quality of care (considered to be good) or to lower cost (considered to
be bad).11  Physicians complain that they face constraints on care decisions
imposed by plans.12  As with consumers, however, the documented reality is not
as bad for physicians as is often portrayed.13  Providers are also concerned about
PROTECTION: CHANGING ROLES FOR STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1999), available at
http://newfederalism.urban.org/pdf/occa28.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
7. See Brennan, supra note 5.
8. See Joseph D. Gottfried & Frank A. Sloan, The Quality of Managed Care: Evidence from the
Medical Literature, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (Autumn 2002).
9. Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash, HEALTH AFF., Jul./Aug.
1998, at 80, 84; Stephen M. Davidson, Can Public Policy Fix What Ails Managed Care?, 24 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 1051, 1052-53 (1999); Paul B. Ginsburg & Cara S. Lesser, The View from
Communities, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1005, 1006 (1999); Gottfried & Sloan, supra note 8, at
103-104.
10. See Blendon et al., supra note 9, at 87-88.
11. R. Adams Dudley & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care in Transition, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1087,
1089 (2001).
12. Karen Davis & Cathy Schoen, Assuring Quality, Information, and Choice in Managed Care, 35
INQUIRY 104, 106 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Dahlia K. Remler et al., What Do Managed Care Plans Do to Effect Care? Results
from a Survey of Physicians, 34 INQUIRY 196 (1997).  A survey of 766 primary-care physicians
practicing in California revealed that seventeen percent of physicians felt that pressure to limit the
number of referrals they authorized was sufficiently severe to adversely affect the quality of care they
could deliver.  Ten percent said that the pressure to limit what they told patients about treatment
options compromised quality of care.  Kevin Grumbach et al., Primary Care Physicians’ Experience of
Financial Incentives in Managed Care Systems, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1518 (1998).  Although the
same study revealed that physicians are dissatisfied with the pressure under managed care to see more
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the discounts that managed care plans are able to negotiate, but the vast
majority of statutes address issues of access and quality of care rather than
payment.
Defenders of managed care respond to these allegations in three ways: (1)
they question the validity of the criticisms of managed care; (2) they observe
that some of the allegations pertain to health insurance more generally and not
just to managed care; and (3) they question whether the cure is more socially
desirable than the alleged market failure itself. 14
The general parameters of this debate are well-developed in the literature
summarized above.  What is less understood is the justification for managed
care regulation in terms of well-articulated market failures (rather than simply
political responses to public and interest group concerns); also needed is an
examination of how well legal enactments and enforcement activities respond to
market failure theory.15  Accordingly, this article addresses two issues.  First,
what is the conceptual basis for managed care patient protection laws?  That is,
what are the market failures that the laws specifically address or do not
address?  Is there a basis for concluding that managed care patient protection
laws are welfare-enhancing in the sense that the potential failures of public
regulation are minor relative to the failures of the managed care market?
Second, this article presents results of a fifty-state survey of state managed care
protection laws and their enforcement.  This article does not assess the effects
of such laws, but rather gauges whether the laws as enacted and implemented
by the states, and proposed in Congress, have the potential to address the
market failures identified in the previous section.  Ultimately, this article
patients, patient visits, on average, are not getting shorter.  David Mechanic, The Managed Care
Backlash: Perceptions and Rhetoric in Health Care Policy and the Potential for Health Care Reform, 79
MILBANK Q. 35, 37-38 (2001).
To the extent that physicians anticipated denials of authorization, they may preemptively behave in
the ways the plans desire them to behave.  In this sense, data on actual denials may be misleading.  For
a summary of evidence on denial rates, see Mechanic, supra, at 45-46.
In August 1997, the U.S. General Accounting Office (“GAO”) reported on a review of contracts
from 529 HMOs.  They found that none of the contracts had specific provisions expressly restricting
physicians from discussing treatment options with their patients.  Two-thirds of the contracts, however,
had nondisparagement, nonsolicitation, or confidentiality clauses.  GAO concluded that these types of
clauses were not likely to affect a physician’s decisions to discuss options with patients.  U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MANAGED CARE: EXPLICIT GAG CLAUSES NOT FOUND IN HMO
CONTRACTS, BUT PHYSICIAN CONCERNS REMAIN (1997).
14. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should Consumers
Call 911?, 43 VILL. L. REV. 409, 453-58, 462-66 (1998); David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care:
What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 223, 234-37, 242-43, 254 (2000).
15. This is cogently observed in DEBORAH L. ROGAL & ROBERT J. STENGER, ACAD. FOR
HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH & HEALTH POLICY, THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGED CARE
REGULATION: MAKING MARKETS WORK? (2001), available at http://www.hcfo.net/
pdf/managedcare.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).  For other articles that take a market theory
perspective on this set of laws, see William Encinosa, The Economics of Regulatory Mandates on the
HMO Market, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 85 (2001); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care
“Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998); Mark Pauly & Marc Berger, Why Should Managed Care be Regulated, in
REGULATING MANAGED CARE: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND FUTURE OPTIONS (Stuart H. Altman et al.
eds., 1999).
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concludes that, although there are some deficiencies in managed care markets
as currently constituted, the patient protection laws overall do not address
many of the most important deficiencies.
II
THE CONCEPTUAL CASE FOR AND AGAINST
MANAGED CARE PATIENT PROTECTION LAWS
A. Consumer Ignorance and Asymmetric Information
1. Critique
Economists have drawn a useful distinction among search, experience, and
credence goods.  Search goods can be evaluated by consumers at a reasonable
cost prior to purchase.16  Such goods either have physical properties that are
easy to evaluate (for example, the cut of a shirt), or there is good information
from readily available sources about the properties of the good.  This may take
the form of private information sources, such as Consumer Reports or Car and
Driver, or simply from word of mouth.  One can learn a lot about a good by
asking friends and acquaintances for opinions.17  In some cases, a public agency
such as the Food and Drug Administration requires disclosure of physical prop-
erties so that the product has acquired the characteristic of a search good, at
least for some aspects, such as the number of calories and cholesterol content of
specific food items.  Otherwise, such information would be costly for the indi-
vidual consumer of the product to monitor.
A second category is experience goods.  Such goods must be consumed
before consumers can assess their quality.  For example, one may be able to
know the calorie content of food from a label, but determining whether the
food is tasty requires actual use.  One might learn something about taste from a
friend who has similar tastes, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating.  In
this sense, most foods are both search and experience goods.  The costs of
trying new experience goods are usually low.  At most, if the good is not tasty,
the consumer is out one or a few units.  Other examples of experience goods are
the medical services of one’s primary care physician or the teaching of a
professor.  While the consumer may gain some information from the supplier’s
reputation, in the end, it is necessary for the consumer to try a unit to really
gauge its quality accurately.
The third type of good is a credence good.18  For such goods, quality cannot
be judged by the ordinary consumer even after the good is consumed.  Given
16. Korobkin, supra note 15, at 27-28 (discussing search, experience, and credence goods in the
context of managed care).
17. Mark A. Satterthwaite, Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price, and the Number of
Sellers, 10 BELL  J. ECON. 483, 484, 494-98 (1979).
18. See generally Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, 28 RAND J. ECON. 107
(1997).
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such lack of information, it is up to the consumer to trust that the product or
service is good, hence the term “credence.”  In the context of medical care, a
patient will often be able to judge whether the outcome of care is favorable or
unfavorable, but may not be able to determine whether the physician practiced
good medicine or actually affected the outcome.  Given the inability to gauge
quality, care is “non-contractible” in the sense that the quality of care cannot be
accurately determined at a reasonable cost, even ex post facto.19  For this
reason, a profit-motivated seller may be tempted to skimp on resources since
the buyer cannot really determine whether adequate resources were allocated
to provision of the good.  In such situations, there is a case for public provision,
or at a minimum, the removal of the financial incentive to skimp on care. This
case is weakened by the difficulty regulators also have in observing true quality,
although regulators will most likely have better access to specialized monitors
of quality than ordinary consumers.
Managed care may be a credence good in two senses.  First, consumers have
difficulty gauging the quality of medical care, especially types of medical care
that are infrequently consumed, such as chemotherapy for breast cancer or
coronary bypass surgery for ischemic heart disease.20  Second, the complexity of
the contract may make it very costly for the ordinary consumer to make
comparisons among the few alternative plans most consumers have.  Although
consumers may be able to process information on a few characteristics, where
there are too many characteristics it is too difficult for most consumers to
process.  For example, ex ante, a potential enrollee with a history of heart
disease may be knowledgeable about the cardiologists in each of the managed
care organization’s (“MCOs”) networks, which from the standpoint of the
functioning of insurance markets is problematic in its own right.21  However, in a
particular year, if the person develops a particular form of cancer, he may be
locked into a provider network without good oncologists.  Or the person may
not have paid adequate attention to the coverage of cancer treatment ex ante
and now must face the choice of either receiving lower quality care or paying
for the better care out-of-pocket.
Because of the inherent complexity of plan choice, what might otherwise be
a search good becomes a credence good.  The consumer’s problem is potentially
19. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer, The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to
Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127 (1997).
20. Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical Care Different?, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 11, 12-13 (Warren Greenberg ed., 1978).  There is a body of literature
indicating that physicians themselves are often unable to make rational, evidence-based judgments
about the appropriateness of particular services for particular patients. See, e.g., Donald W. Moran,
Federal Regulation of Managed Care: An Impulse in Search of Theory, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 1997,
at 7.  This gives greater force to the consumer ignorance argument, but it limits the force of the
information asymmetry argument.
21. This is a problem of adverse selection. People who anticipate substantial use of specialty care
may select health plans with the best (and most costly) specialists in their networks.  For general
discussions of this phenomenon, see, for example, David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The
Anatomy of Health Insurance, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 606 (A. J. Culyer & J. P.
Newhouse eds., 2000) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
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exacerbated if the physician has a financial incentive to withhold care or if the
physician is bound by the plan to withhold information about treatments that
may be costly to the plan but potentially beneficial to the patient.  The public
seems distrustful of the motives of decision-makers who are accountable to  pri-
vate self-interest and stockholders.22  The traditional safeguard for the credence
good problem has been physician professionalism, but this attitude has been
eroding,23 and it serves as an imperfect consumer safeguard in its own right.24
The credence good issue is more significant under managed care than under
traditional indemnity insurance for this reason: Under indemnity insurance, a
person has a free choice of provider without financial consequences at the time
of illness.  Under managed care, the person agrees in advance to the plan, which
has a contractual right to regulate medical care at the time illness occurs.  The
patient/consumer always has the option of paying for care denied by the plan
out-of-pocket, but denial of coverage is often viewed by the public as
“rationing,” even though consumers in their role as employees should benefit
from lower premiums.  Thus, consumers need to be more forward-looking
under managed care than under traditional indemnity insurance.25  Although the
private managed care market has undertaken efforts to provide comparative
information to consumers, overall, these efforts have not engendered much
confidence that consumers are truly better informed about characteristics of
alternative health plans.26  In recent years, direct access to specialists has
22. See Mark A. Hall, The Theory and Practice of Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 208 (Autumn 2002); David Mechanic, Managed Care and the Imperative for a
New Professional Ethic, HEALTH AFF., Sept/Oct. 2000, at 108.
23. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Lee Goldman, Protecting Patient Welfare in Managed Care: Six
Safeguards, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 635 (1999); William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 1529, 1551-53, 1584-97 (1999).
24. James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Government’s Role in Health Care: Is a Dose
of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1981).  Reliance on
professional “norms” has at least two limitations in this context.  First, physician and consumer
preferences for care may not coincide.  Second, physicians may pursue their own financial interests,
which may lead to choices that are not in the patient’s best interests.
25. For discussions of the incidence of health insurance premiums, see Alan B. Krueger & Uwe E.
Reinhardt, The Economics of Employer versus Individual Mandates, HEALTH AFF., Spring II 1994, at
34; Mark V. Pauly, HEALTH BENEFITS AT WORK: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF
EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE (1997); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Predictable Managed Care
Kvetch on the Rocky Road from Adolescence to Adulthood, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y. & L. 897, 903-
04 (1999).
26. See Moran, supra note 20, at 13. In North Carolina (a relatively populous state) in 2002, there
were three Medicare health plans (health maintenance organizations) available to Medicare enrollees.
The plans only covered selected locations within the state, and residents of particular locations had at
most two choices.  A brochure described the options, listing only the plan name, the plan service area,
monthly premium, type of HMO, the copay amount, and whether prescription drug coverage, routine
physical exams, and vision services were included. There are, of course, many other dimensions that
consumers may find relevant to their choice of plan. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
MEDICARE & YOU (2002), at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/mandy; Lauren D.
Harris-Kojetin et al., Beneficiaries’ Perceptions of New Medicare Health Plan Choice Print Materials, 23
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 21 (2001) (providing assessments of information provided to
Medicare beneficiaries in general and of the MEDICARE & YOU publication in particular); Lauren A.
McCormack et al., Beneficiary Survey Based Feedback on New Medicare Informational Materials, 23
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 37 (2001) (same).
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become a sought-after feature by consumers.27  The trend away from the
gatekeeper model seems to indicate that patients either are not or do not want
to be forward-looking.
In another sense, managed care bears a resemblance to an experience good
as well. Normally, if one does not like a good, one can switch to the competi-
tor’s product. But in this context, the critics argue that this market-disciplining
force is absent since (1) patients’ options may be limited by employers’ choices
or by open enrollment restrictions; (2) the competing plans may have the same
objectionable features;28 and (3) salient details that may account for a con-
sumer’s adverse experience are not disclosed.  Lacking an exit voice, legislation
is the main voice option.29
2. Counterpoint
The notion that consumers of medical care have imperfect information and
physicians have better health information than their patients is neither new in
general nor unique to managed care in particular.30  Likewise, the concept of
limitations on individuals’ cognitive ability to process large and complicated
problems—bounded rationality—is about as old.31  The key to this debate is how
one regards these limitations on perfect information and rationality.  If one
assumes that such limitations are minor, tolerable, or inevitable, then it is
unnecessary to protect people against the consequences of their choices.  How-
ever, if people are not considered to be informed, rational consumers, even
under normal circumstances, this implies that there is a need for some form of
public intervention to improve information flow.
At the most general level, arguments about consumer knowledge and
rationality rapidly become unproductive.  People may be forward-looking and
reasonably informed about some decisions, such as the decision to seek an
education in a profession,32 but myopic about others, such as an adolescent’s
decision to start smoking.33  Whether assumptions of adequate knowledge and
27. See Ginsburg & Lesser, supra note 9, at 1010-11.
28. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 23, at 641.
29. Marc A. Rodwin, Backlash as Prelude to Managing Care, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L., 1115,
1119 (1999) [hereinafter Rodwin, Backlash].  For greater detail, see Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer
Protection and Managed Care: Issues, Reform Proposal, and Trade-offs, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1321 (1996).
In a medical care context in general, he argues that an individual consumer is rarely in a favorable
position to challenge a provider when there is a problem.  The situation is worse, however, in managed
care, where the patient must contend not only with a physician but also with a formidable
administrative organization.  Id.
30. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AMER.
ECON. REV. 941 (1963).
31. Herbert A. Simon, MODELS OF MAN (1957); Herbert A. Simon, MODELS OF BOUNDED
RATIONALITY (1982); Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99
(1955); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV.
129 (1956).
32. Michael P. Keane & Kenneth I. Wolpin, The Career Decisions of Young Men, 105 J. POL’Y
ECON. 473 (1997).
33. See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., PARSING THE SMOKING PUZZLE: INFORMATION, RISK
PERCEPTION AND CHOICE (forthcoming 2003) (using data on persons over fifty years old to find
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rationality are tenable is both context- and individual-specific.  In context, is it
reasonable to assume that people can predict their own utility in a specific state
of the world, that is, to know what they will like?34  This plausibly depends on
whether experience goods or credence goods are involved.  For credence goods,
this is unlikely even after the person has consumed the good.  Also, people
differ in their cognitive abilities to process information relevant for market
choices and to obtain such pertinent information.
In the context of managed care, the question becomes how much people
understand about their choices.  That a person with a particular form of cancer
demands the latest therapy is not at all surprising.  Moral hazard, reflecting a
reduced price at the point of service, would lead the patient to do this.  The
patient with health insurance is, for all practical purposes, fully insured for
major expense and thus demands all improvements in care that yield as little as
zero marginal benefit.  And to the extent that the physician does not share in
the marginal cost of such care, and in fact stands to profit from delivering
additional services, he too may recommend such care, given the financial
incentive he faces.
However, from an ex ante perspective, prior to a particular condition aris-
ing, an informed individual may realize that once an illness strikes he will want
to consume care up to the level at which the marginal expected benefit from
care is zero.  Realizing this temptation, a forward-looking person may set up
barriers to overuse in advance.  This is much like precommitting to saving a
given amount each month by specifying that cash be deposited into savings each
month before one receives a paycheck.  Or people may eschew buying peach ice
cream, knowing that if the ice cream is in the home, it may be consumed before
bedtime.35
Such planning for future contingencies is a difficult task.  Not only must the
assessments be made ex ante, but future utilities must be assessed at various
care levels for a particular condition.  The problem is further complicated by
the multiplicity of possible conditions.
Empirical evidence on consumer knowledge about provisions of their health
plans is very limited, and hence the full extent of market failure due to imper-
fect consumer information is unknown.36  One recent study compared consumer
evidence that older smokers are forward-looking about their choices about quitting); Jonathan Gruber
& Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”?: Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1261 (2001).
34. Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, in CHOICES, VALUES, &
FRAMES 765, 765-67 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
35. See JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND EMOTION (1999)
(describing the concept of two selves in the same individual, where one self is rational and forward-
looking, while the other self is short-sighted and impulsive).
36. Korobkin argues that “the efficient outcome (from managed care) depends, like the predictions
of most economic models, on the assumption that consumers are ruthless optimizers—that they
carefully compared the detailed descriptions and fine print of health insurance plans, that they make
complicated trade offs between price and services, and that they reward (with reenrollment) the MCO
that tailors its offering to their preferences and punish (by selecting a competing plan) those that fail to
do so.”  See Korobkin, supra note 15, at 45.  This statement can be analyzed on both a conceptual and
an empirical level. Conceptually, no one would maintain that people are typically “ruthless optimizers.”
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perceptions of their plans with the actual plan provisions.37  Consumers were
generally knowledgeable about three of the four provisions studied; they over-
estimated the extent to which their plans restricted their access to specialists.  If
questions were asked about care patterns and levels for particular conditions, it
is likely that consumers’ perceptions would have been far less accurate.38
B. Imperfect Risk Adjustment
1. Critique
Under ideal circumstances, insurers would receive a premium commensu-
rate with the actuarial value of expected losses.  Because of differences in health
and in tastes for medical care, consumers differ in the actuarial value of the loss
in ways that cannot be perfectly observed by insurers.  This produces the phe-
nomenon known as adverse selection, in which those who seek insurance are at
greater risk than the risk anticipated by the insurer.  Insurers adopt various
techniques for coping with adverse selection, including waiting periods and con-
tracts designed to separate high from low users,39 but these methods are imper-
fect, and their use is limited by regulations that promote access to insurance by
those at higher risk.
Even if there were no adverse selection in the initial choice of plan, suppose
that a consumer develops an expensive chronic condition in a year.  Given
imperfect risk adjustment, the MCO will not want to retain the patient in the
plan.  Under perfect risk adjustment, premiums would rise to reflect the higher
actuarial value of the loss after the person acquired the new condition.  How-
ever, currently there is only limited use of risk-adjusted premiums and capita-
tion rates to reward plans for providing care to sicker patients.40  Therefore,
MCOs have an incentive to deliver lower quality care in the hope that sick pa-
tients will leave the plan.  If patients are unable to appreciate gradations in
Nor is being ruthless in pursuit of self-interest a necessary condition for the market to lead to desirable
outcomes.  At an empirical level, Korobkin cites general articles from the psychological literature to
argue for bounded rationality in the context of managed care.  Id. at 48-51 (citing Herbert Simon,
James March, John Payne, and coauthors James Bettman and Amos Tversky). More compelling
evidence would come from choices people make about their health care in general and about choice of
health insurance plan in particular.  Such empirical evidence is currently lacking and merits a high
priority for research.
37. Using data from the 1996 to 1997 Community Tracking Study, Cunningham and coauthors
studied consumer information about plans by comparing consumers’ responses on four study attributes
of their health plan with information provided by the health plan.  Peter J. Cunningham et al., Do
Consumers Know How Their Health Plan Works?, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 159, 160.  The
enrollees had fairly accurate perceptions of three of the four plan attributes; they tended to
substantially overestimate restrictions on access to specialists, the fourth attribute.  Id. at 161-62.
38. Even so, one can ask whether a fully informed consumer would have preferred a plan granting
access to care up to the point of zero marginal benefit over one that limits access to care with marginal
benefit less than marginal cost but with a lower premium.  An interesting study would be to analyze the
plan choices physicians would make when faced with this cost-quality trade-off.
39. Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976); see also Cutler &
Zeckhauser, supra note 21, at 634-37.
40. Robert A. Berenson, Beyond Competition, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 1997, at 171.
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quality, MCOs may retain these patients, but at least they will save money.  If
patients recognize that they are receiving less care, they will leave, which saves
the plan money in future periods.  Thus, the inability to accurately measure
health risk and fully reflect it in payments to insurers is a form of market failure
that can give rise to consumer protection concerns.  This is one reason why
inadequate risk adjustment may be thought of as the Achilles heel of managed
care and managed competition.41
2. Counterpoint
The most direct solution to inadequate risk adjustment is an improvement in
the method of risk adjustment.42  If MCOs are paid for the increase in the actu-
arial value of coverage following the onset of a condition, they will have a lower
incentive to avoid sick patients or to attract only healthy ones, a practice known
as cream skimming.  However, risk adjustment at present is far from an exact
science.  Thus, at least for now, it is necessary to rely on several second-best
market and public policy alternatives for mitigating preferred risk selection of
healthy persons by MCOs.  Included among the market mechanisms is potential
reputation loss when a plan excludes its sickest members, and pressures from
tertiary care providers and specialists that may contract with MCOs to care for
the sickest persons.  Among the public regulatory mechanisms that precede the
managed care patient protection movement are laws on guaranteed insurability
and renewability of insurance.  These laws prevent more overt forms of cream
skimming, but in doing so they encourage subtler forms.
Given inadequate risk adjustment, MCOs have a disincentive to retain sick
customers.  Again, the issue of market failure hinges on information.  In the
41. This is more of a problem in the context of managed care than in that of indemnity health
insurance for two reasons.  First, adverse selection is worse when people have a choice of health plans,
since this gives them more opportunity to sort themselves into higher and lower risk groups (rather
than simply declining insurance altogether).  Under traditional insurance, which sets no limits, there
was little need to offer a choice of plans; however, larger employers who offer HMOs usually offer a
choice of plans.  Second, managed care provides insurers many more opportunities to discourage higher
risks than does traditional insurance.
42. Expenditures on personal health care services are subject to both large random variation as
well as predictable variation among individuals. The latter gives rise to adverse selection by those
demanding health insurance and preferred risk selection by insurers. One study concluded that overall,
managed care plans have a twenty to thirty percent prior utilization advantage over conventional
indemnity plans, which would reflect a combination of selection of favorable risks by MCOs and
adverse selection of less healthy persons toward conventional health insurance plans rather than
HMOs.  Sherry Glied, Managed Care, in HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 731.
To cope with these problems, the solution of which is a necessary condition for competitive health
insurance markets to function in the public interest, researchers have developed various risk
adjustment approaches.  Risk adjustment accounts for variations among insureds in anticipated health
care expenditures so as to permit development of more accurate premiums.  For a comprehensive
review of risk adjustment approaches, see Wynand P.M.M. van de Ven, Risk Adjustment in Competitive
Health Plan Markets, in HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 606, 757.  For a discussion of risk adjustment in
the context of Medicare, see Leslie M. Greenwald, Medicare Risk-Adjusted Capitation Payments: From
Research to Implementation, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring 2000, at 1, 2-3, as well as Lisa
Iezzoni & John Ayanian, Paying More Fairly for Medicare Capitated Care, 139 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1933
(1998).  Rather than impose special data collection requirements, risk-adjustment methods typically are
based on information routinely collected as part of the patient encounter, such as ICD-9-CM codes.
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short run, MCOs may employ techniques to encourage sick customers to
disenroll.  But, in the longer run, healthy persons will not want to join a plan
that forces sick people out; they demand insurance because they face a
nontrivial probability of becoming sick themselves.  A response might be that
dumping is difficult for outsiders to observe.  But if it is difficult for a purchaser,
such as an employer, to observe such practices, can one have confidence that a
public regulator will have better access to such information?  The answer to this
question cannot be deduced; empirical evidence, currently lacking, is needed.
Furthermore, given the subtleties of risk selection, public regulation without
adequate risk adjustment is likely to require considerable government
expenditures for monitoring.
C. Myopic Orientation of Health Plans
1. Critique
MCO decision-making sometimes seems overly oriented to achieving short-
run returns.  Health maintenance organizations got their name because they
were to maintain health, using preventive care as appropriate.43  If the relation-
ship between an enrollee and the plan were long standing, a plan offering a
combination of preventive care interventions that minimize personal health
expenditures over a long time span would be able to capture the downstream
savings.  With high rates of enrollee turnover, however, any such savings will
probably accrue to other plans.
Also, the quality of information systems may be adversely affected by
member turnover.  The data for the information system comes in part from
patient encounters while enrolled in the plan.  Turnover reduces the potential
of plans to track patients and physicians with whom they contract, as well as the
incentive of plans to do this.  Some experts have expressed concern about the
lack of health plan investment in information systems, which may be critical to
plans’ holding providers accountable for their services and for monitoring qual-
ity of care.44  Critics claim that lack of appropriate information systems works
against the managed care industry’s claim that it can manage care better than
traditional insurers.45
For various reasons, including MCO exits and entry, as well as changing
contractual relationships between MCOs and providers, enrollee turnover
43. See Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980: A
Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512 (1994) (comparing preventive care in managed care versus
traditional indemnity plans). Preventive care in managed care is a little higher.  Better coverage of
preventive care, however, may be used by MCOs to attract a healthier than average enrollment.  See
Glied, supra note 42, at 712.
44. CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, MANAGED CARE WOES: INDUSTRY TRENDS
AND CONFLICTS 3 (1998), available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/68/index.html (last visited
Sept. 19, 2002).
45. See Rodwin, Backlash, supra note 29, at 1117.
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appears to be about twenty-five percent per year.46  Although forward-looking
consumers may in principle demand contracts with MCOs offering cost-
minimizing levels of prevention, at a minimum, turnover makes it more costly to
carry out a coordinated plan of preventive care interventions.
2. Counterpoint
The threat that an unsatisfied consumer will switch to a competitor is an
important form of market discipline under competition.  In this sense, if there
were less churning from switching plans, the plans would have less incentive to
satisfy consumer wants than they do presently.  Firm exit/entry also is integral
to the proper functioning of a competitive market.  Some recent MCO exits
from the Medicare Choice Program may be attributable to inadequate payment.
Raising such payment may reduce high rates of enrollee turnover or churning,
but this too comes at a cost.  Various forms of solvency regulation, a traditional
role of state insurance departments, may provide one, albeit imperfect, safe-
guard by limiting entry of MCOs that have a relatively high probability of insol-
vency.  Bars to MCO entry should in part reflect the transaction costs incurred
by switching and the degradation in quality of services of MCOs, including pos-
sibly lack of preventive care, as they become insolvent.
Because some degree of turnover is essential in a healthy, competitive
market, plans will not have perfect incentives to invest in long-term preventive
care.  Patient protection laws conceivably could attempt to correct for this
imperfection.  However, by raising plan outlays for care, patient protection laws
might also worsen the problem by increasing costs or altering market conditions
in a fashion that leads to more turnover.  For instance, giving providers more
bargaining clout may lead to more contract terminations, causing patients to
switch plans in order to keep the same physician.  It is still too early to deter-
mine whether the state laws have had these adverse effects.
D. Lack of Consumer Choice
1. Critique
Most private health insurance is purchased as group insurance through
employers.  This occurs for various market reasons (economies of scale in pro-
vision and avoidance of adverse selection by consumers) and public policy rea-
sons (tax subsidy and ERISA preemption).47  Because group insurance requires
a single contract for a large pool, however, it restricts the ability to vary contrac-
tual terms to fit individual tastes.
Moreover, employer-based coverage may introduce agency problems.48  An
employer’s preference does not necessarily reflect the preference of the
46. Mark A. Hall, Legal Rules and Industry Norms: The Impact of Laws Restricting Health
Insurers’ Use of Genetic Information, 40 JURIMETRICS 93, 109 (1999).
47. David A. Hyman & Mark A. Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 25-29 (2002).
48. Id. at 27.
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workforce as a whole, much less the preference of any single employee,
although there is a financial incentive for the employer to honor preferences of,
at a minimum, the average employee.49
One mechanism for accounting for employee heterogeneity is to provide
plan choice, but economies of scale limit the number of plans that any one
employer can offer. Although this problem is not unique to managed care,
managed care restricts choice of provider at the point of service, which may
exacerbate the problem.
2. Counterpoint
Decoupling employment and acquisition of health insurance could increase
consumer choice.  However, this would also increase the administrative cost of
insurance and increase adverse selection.  To achieve economies of scale in the
provision of health insurance, a second-best option may be to use purchasing
pool arrangements that replicate options that consumers would have in a more
atomistic market structure.  Adverse selection problems would remain, none-
theless; and new purchasing arrangements would add additional complexities to
the already labyrinthine set of state and federal insurance regulations, which
might undermine already fragile existing market structures.50  Therefore, an
argument exists for increasing the range of choices that consumers have within
their health plans.
E. Standardization of Care
1. Critique
Optimal care is provided where the marginal benefit of such care equals
marginal cost.  This normative standard requires that costs and benefits be
measured from a social perspective, that is, considering the cost borne by all
parties, not just the patient, and also including external costs and benefits.  Tra-
ditional fee-for-service insurance tends to over-provide care at a level where
marginal cost exceeds marginal benefit.51  Using a combination of external
incentives, physician selection, and information for physicians in the form of
practice guidelines and utilization review, the promise of managed care is to
allocate resources so that equality of marginal benefit and cost is achieved.  For
a variety of reasons, including those discussed in this subsection, the socially
optimal allocation of resources may not be attained.
49. In interviews with insurance agents, one of us (Hall) heard that small employers often pick the
managed care plan that has the owner’s personal physician in the network.
50. Mark A. Hall et al., Health Marts, HIPCs, MEWAs, and AHPs: A Guide for the Perplexed,
HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2001, at 142, 147-51.
51. Thomas G. McGuire, Physician Agency, in HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 503-19.
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2. Counterpoint
A strength of the traditional professional model52 in which patients and phy-
sicians interact on a one-on-one basis, ostensibly making decisions on the basis
of the patient’s clinical condition and preferences, is full recognition of patient
heterogeneity in both condition and preferences.  Although practice guidelines
used by MCOs and others presumably reflect average benefit for a specified set
of patient characteristics and clinical circumstances, in the end they cannot fully
reflect the unique circumstances of each individual patient.  Thus, even if
adherence to a particular guideline were to improve care on average, in follow-
ing the guidelines, physicians may substantially miss the mark in particular
cases—hence the association of “cookbook medicine” with practice guidelines.
The loss from such errors should be weighed against the possible improvement
in care from adherence to practice guidelines. Given the growth in net-
work/independent practice plans,53 individual physicians are likely to face het-
erogeneity in the guidelines themselves.  Adhering to many guidelines is
undoubtedly costly to the individual physician.  The multiplicity of plans and
contracts imposes substantial transaction costs at the level of the physician prac-
tice and impedes diffusion of cost-reducing technologies and strategies.54
Although use of guidelines may be improved by implementing information sys-
tems, there is, as noted above, likely to be underinvestment in such information
systems in view of the high rate of exit/entry in this sector.
Provision of care by physicians in closed panel plans would make adherence
to a particular set of practice guidelines much more feasible.  Perhaps the wide-
spread consumer interest in open panel arrangements for doctors reflects a rea-
soned judgment that the gain from adherence to guidelines is not worth the loss
in freedom of choice of one’s physician.  If so, the current lack of adherence to
guidelines is not problematic.  On the other hand, one can take a less sanguine
view of the consumer whereby the consumer does not know what he or she is
missing.  In this latter case, lack of adherence to guidelines is possibly a very
serious market failure.
F. Conclusion: Do the Alleged Market Failures Justify Managed Care Patient
Protection Laws?
Several potential sources of failure in the MCO market have been discussed
in this section: consumer ignorance and asymmetric information; imperfect risk
adjustment; myopic orientation of health plans; lack of consumer choice; and
excessive standardization.  Clearly, all was not well with managed care at the
turn of the century.  Some public concern is justified.
52. Mechanic, supra note 22, at 100; Rosemary A. Stevens, Public Roles for the Medical Profession
in the United States: Beyond Theories of Decline and Fall, 79 MILBANK Q. 327, 332-34 (2001).
53. Jon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 1990s, HEALTH AFF., May/June 1997,
at 134, 136; Marsha Gold, The Changing US Health Care System: Challenges for Responsible Public
Policy, 77 MILBANK Q. 3, 11-14 (1999).
54. Harold S. Luft, Why are Physicians So Upset about Managed Care?, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 957, 965 (1999).
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Managed care’s potential, at least as it exists currently, to deal with the ills
of the U.S. health care system has been oversold.  However, diagnosing
managed care’s deficiencies is much easier than designing public policies to deal
effectively with the defects.  Moreover, some of the defects may simply reflect
the industry’s immaturity and so may prove to be partially self-correcting.
Hastily conceived cures to real problems may have worse long-run effects than
the underlying disease.
Nevertheless, every state has responded in some fashion to perceived defi-
ciencies in managed care.  Much of the response has been very recent, preclud-
ing a detailed empirical evaluation of the performance of these laws.  However,
much can be learned by simply documenting what the states are doing—the
subject of the next section.
III
STATE PATIENT PROTECTION LAWS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT
A. Methodology
This section reports the results of a detailed examination of the pattern of
state patient protection legislation and the level of enforcement by state
agencies.  Our analysis is based on several sources of information.  Preliminary
information about state enactments was collected from the National
Conference of State Legislatures and the Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Association of America (“Blue Cross”), each of which tracks state legislation
relating to managed care and health insurance.  These existing compilations,
however, have several limitations,55 and, therefore, independent evaluation and
supplementation was necessary.  The actual text of each statute (through the
end of 2001) was read, and state regulators in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia were surveyed during the summer of 2001 to determine whether
additional legal sources, such as regulations, had been overlooked.56  This
information was used to develop a detailed coding of state statutes and
regulations and their effective dates.
In addition, the 2001 survey of state regulators determined the level of
regulatory enforcement.57  Information from a similar survey on medical
55. Most personnel who conduct this tracking do not have law degrees, and Blue Cross is a trade
association that collects this information for advocacy as well as research purposes.  Also, only statutory
enactments can be comprehensively tracked, so these compilations have only spotty coverage of
regulations.  Finally, these existing compilations do not provide as much detail about the law’s content
as is required for some research purposes, and they use different classification schemes that are not
always consistent with the purpose or focus of other researchers.
56. For each major law, regulators were asked whether the law existed in statute or in regulations
prior to or apart from specific statutory provisions.  We did not compile information on regulations that
merely implement a specific statutory enactment.
57. Surveys were mailed to three to five regulators responsible for regulating managed care health
insurance in each state.  These regulators were requested to consult with each other, and with other
colleagues, as needed, in order to generate a single survey response.  Responses were obtained from all
states.  In a few instances, more than one response was returned from a single state, in which case
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necessity and coverage determinations conducted by researchers at Stanford
University was included.58  Survey data were supplemented with information
about general regulatory resources and enforcement activities from the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners.  Additional data were
obtained from various public sources such as the Urban Institute’s New
Federalism project.
B. State Enactments
1. The Pattern of State Enactments
The history of state enactments is presented in Table 1, and Table 2 presents
more information about the content and pattern of these enactments.  By the
end of 2001, all but three states59 had some type of law described as a managed
care “patient bill of rights” or “patient protection act.”  Eight states first
adopted such laws in 1995 or 1996, five states did not have their first major
enactments until 2000 and 2001, and the majority (thirty-five) enacted legisla-
tion between 1997 and 1999.
discrepancies were resolved by follow-up phone calls.  Missing responses were filled in by follow-up
calls and by supplemental research on agency web sites and in specialty publications.
58. Linda A. Bergthold & Sara J. Singer, Problems in Medical Necessity Decision Making (2002
working draft) (on file with authors).
59. Alabama, Michigan, Utah, and Wyoming.
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TABLE 1:


































New Hampshire 1998 11
New Jersey 1997 16
New Mexico 1997 15
New York 1997 12
North Carolina 2001 15
North Dakota 1999 8
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Rhode Island 1997 12
South Carolina 1999 13







West Virginia 1998 10
Wisconsin 1999 9
Wyoming None 3
None = 3 states
1995-96 = 8 states Low 3rd=7.3
1997 = 19 states
1998 = 8 states Med 3rd=10.7
1999 = 8 states
2000-01 = 5 states High 3rd=13.8
Federal Bills 14
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This compilation tracks seventeen separate provisions in this body of law,
described in detail below.  As of the end of 2001, no state had all seventeen and
the leading federal bills had fourteen provisions.  Over half the states (twenty-
seven) had at least eleven of these provisions (both the mean and median were
eleven), and only eight states60 had fewer than eight provisions.  Eight states had
as many of these provisions (fourteen) as are in the leading federal bills.61
The most popular state laws were those prohibiting so-called “gag clauses”
and requiring the use of a “prudent layperson” standard to determine coverage
of emergency services.  Both of these laws existed in nearly every state (fifty
and forty-seven jurisdictions, respectively, out of fifty-one).  In the view of
commentators, these are among the least significant of the different forms of
patient protection.62
The least frequent laws were those imposing tort liability on managed care
plans (fourteen states) and funding ombudsmen to advise and assist patients in
filing appeals (eighteen states).  These are among the provisions most favored
by consumer advocates, and states with these provisions have the strongest
packages of laws overall.63  These contrasts lend credence to the claim that
patient protection laws are, in large part, window dressing intended to assuage
political pressure to take some visible action against managed care.  This view is
also reinforced by observing that several of the more common provisions exist
primarily in a limited or weak version.
Despite these limitations, as of the end of 2001, several significant provisions
existed in a large number of states.  Most states (forty-two) required a process
for independent, external review of insurers’ coverage decisions and required
that women be allowed to go to obstetricians or gynecologists without the
approval of a gatekeeper.  Roughly half the states:
(1) allowed patients with chronic conditions to receive care from specialists
without a gatekeeper’s approval each time;
(2) required HMOs to offer purchasers a point-of-service option;
(3) defined medical necessity in a manner that limits private parties’ ability
to set coverage standards by contract;
(4) limited the use of financial incentives that encourage physicians to con-
tain costs;
(5) gave physicians procedural protections before they can be removed from
an insurer’s network; and
(6) prohibited insurers from seeking indemnification from physicians for the
insurers’ liability.
60. Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
61. Maryland, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, New Mexico, Texas, and Virginia.
62. See Joan H. Krause, The Brief Life of the Gag Clause: Why Anti-Gag Legislation Isn’t Enough,
67 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1999).  The prohibition of so-called “drive-through deliveries,” which exists in
forty-one states, also has been criticized as largely symbolic.  David Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries:
Is “Consumer Protection” Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N.C. L. REV. 5 (1999).
63. States with both of these laws have an average of fifteen provisions; states with one or both of
these laws average twelve provisions; and states with neither law average nine provisions.  See Table 2.
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These provisions are especially noteworthy from a market failure perspective
and each will be discussed in greater detail, according to the groupings shown in
Table 2.
2. Liability and Appeal Laws, and Preserving Physician Independence.
Liability provisions address two issues.64  Most are aimed at holding HMOs
and MCOs responsible for errors in making insurance coverage decisions.
These laws adopt principles similar to bad faith liability under other types of
insurance by imposing personal injury and sometimes punitive damages on
insurers for failing to adhere to a specified standard of care in deciding whether
treatment is covered by the terms of the insurance policy.  The second type of
liability law is focused on medical treatment decisions rather than insurance
coverage decisions.  These laws hold HMOs responsible for negligence commit-
ted by their agents, including treating physicians, in delivering medical care,65
and they prohibit HMOs from shifting this responsibility exclusively to physi-
cians by barring indemnification clauses in managed care contracts with physi-
cians.
These liability laws respond directly to the market failure that results from
patients’ inability to judge quality.66  The first type of law relates to the quality
of the insurance function and the second type to the quality of medical care.67
When it is difficult for consumers to evaluate quality at the point of purchase,
market pressures may be insufficient to create financial penalties for shirking.
In theory, tort liability will encourage plans to provide care and to honor their
promises up to the level at which the marginal cost of extra care equals the
marginal benefit of harm avoided.68  Also, plans may be more likely to adopt
information systems directed toward loss prevention.  On the other hand,
liability may cause some plans to exit, further limiting consumer choice and
increasing the amount of enrollee turnover that now occurs.
The liability provisions addressing medical treatment share a second, more
controversial market failure rationale.  They respond to the concern that MCOs
may compromise physicians’ professional independence.  Patients rely heavily
on their physicians’ advice in deciding what course of medical care, if any, to
64. For a more detailed description, see PATRICIA BUTLER, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEY
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION LIABILITY LAWS (2001), at
http://www.kff. org/content/2001/3155/MCOReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2002).
65. Usually this takes the form of declaring that MCOs are not immune from shared liability by
virtue of the general prohibition of the corporate practice of medicine, which a few states have
interpreted to mean that MCOs cannot be held responsible for medical treatment decisions.  Because
most states do not interpret the corporate practice doctrine this way, most states have no trouble
holding MCOs responsible under ordinary tort and agency principles, often by extending precedents
previously set for hospital liability.  See Sharon M. Glenn, Comment, Tort Liability of Integrated Health
Care Delivery Systems: Beyond Enterprise Liability, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305 (1994).
66. See supra Part IIA.
67. Naturally, in MCOs, there is substantial overlap between the two, since coverage is often
determined by medical criteria (“medically necessary”), and treatment decisions are influenced by
whether coverage is available.
68. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Ch. 6 (4th ed. 1992).
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undertake.  Patients assume that physicians will not compromise their best
interests, but new and sometimes hidden features of managed care may weaken
physicians’ fidelity.  Ideally, liability acts as a safeguard for this agency
relationship.  It might be thought that physician liability is sufficient to protect
patients’ interests with respect to the core quality of care, making MCO liability
merely redundant.69  However, to the extent that MCOs influence physicians to
consider interests that are inconsistent with patients’ interests, an agency
imperfection is introduced that MCO liability helps to correct.  Similarly, other
provisions more directly preserve physician independence and the fidelity of
physician agency by limiting the use of distorting financial incentives, requiring
that physicians be allowed to speak their mind to patients, and giving physicians
procedural protections that limit health plans’ ability to discipline physicians
who stand up for patients’ rights.
The Coase Theorem implies that mandatory liability would not be necessary
if we could expect market negotiations to assign liability in the fashion that
optimizes the parties’ collective interests.70  In the managed care context,
however, there are special reasons why this might not be the case (beyond the
generic issues of imperfect contracts, asymmetric bargaining power, and
transaction costs).  First, employers negotiate the primary insurance contract,
and they may not fully or accurately reflect employees’ preferences about
liability.  Second, liability for medical decisions is affected by behind-the-scenes
contracting between MCOs and physicians that employers and patients may
lack either the knowledge or the ability to alter.
Even if imposing liability in this context is viewed as desirable, the fact that
only a small number of states have imposed liability by statute does not
necessarily indicate a regulatory failure.  Most states recognize (or at least do
not contradict) these principles in their common law judicial rulings.  Therefore,
all that is needed is to bar shifting of liability through indemnification clauses,
which half the states do.  The greatest difficulty, therefore, comes from the
preemption of state common law remedies by the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (“ERISA”).  Without federal legislation on liability, state
enactments that simply codify or modify common law are partially futile
gestures.
External review laws address these same issues and share the same
justifications.  Because the goal is to conduct external review prior to any harm
occurring from denial of treatment, social and private costs may be reduced.
Since external review is less threatening to insurers than liability, it is less likely
69. Patricia Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 507-
08, 512-19 (1997); see also Richard A. Epstein & Alan O. Sykes, John M. Olin Program in Law &
Econ., The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, Class Actions, and the Patient’s Bill of Rights,
Working Paper No. 112 (Dec. 2000), at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_101-
25/112.RAE-AOS.Managed%20Care%20paper.pdf.
70. For an explanation of the Coase Theorem and a discussion of its importance to law, economics,
and public policy, see David de Meza, Coase Theorem, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS & THE LAW 270-82 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
SLOANHALL_FMT.DOC 10/02/02  1:50 PM
Page 169: Autumn 2002] MARKET FAILURES 193
to increase plan exit rates, which is a source of turnover that leads to a myopic
view when plans make decisions about long-term investments in preventive
care.71
Additionally, external review addresses the problem of incomplete or
“relational” contracting that arises from the inability to specify in concrete
detail exactly what medical services are covered by insurance, a problem
exacerbated by patient heterogeneity.  This difficulty results in very broad
insurance coverage terms (such as “medically necessary”, “nonexperimental”,
and “noncustodial”), that give great discretion to the initial decision-maker—
the insurer or utilization review entity.  Since these decision-makers have a
conflict of interest, unreviewable decisions are not likely to result in coverage
that fully meets the ex ante expectations of the contracting parties (that is, the
decision they would have reached at the time of bargaining had they been able
to address and fully articulate the specific issue under dispute).72
External review helps to solve these contracting imperfections.  However,
there is good reason to question whether even the reviewers will apply the con-
tractually determined standard of coverage.  If given legislative permission, or
even if not, reviewers may insist on care where the marginal benefit is zero, or
nearly so.
As with liability, one can ask why the parties might not themselves require
external review by contract, or why external review ought not be simply a
default rule that parties opt out of by explicit contract.  Responses to these
possibilities are identical to those regarding the liability provisions—the
transaction costs, information limitations, and agency imperfections that arise
from the complex nature of this four-party contracting network (patient,
provider, health plan, and employer).  However, the concern may be greater
here.  There is a tendency in these laws (discussed more below) to specify not
only a review process but also a substantive standard for coverage, by defining
what medical necessity means or by requiring the use of a general medical
necessity criterion.  This foreclosure of contractual options requires additional
justification and scrutiny.
3. Provider-Access Laws
Laws that enhance patients’ access to physicians and providers exist in two
general categories.  Broader laws allow access to providers for any patient who
might desire access or whenever such access might have medical justification.
Narrower laws restrict these access rights to special categories of care or espe-
71. See supra Part IIC.
72. Naturally, there is a significant risk that these decisions will be made from the ex post
perspective of an ill patient who has already purchased insurance, which introduces a different type of
conflict of interest (cost is no object for a patient who has no other options, even if the treatment has
very low to no probability of working).  See Mark A. Hall & Gerard Anderson, Models of Rationing:
Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1676-81 (1992).  However,
this bias is not greatly different from the hindsight bias that tends to affect liability decisions.  Neither
bias is a strong enough reason to avoid these protections altogether, but they strongly inform the
proper procedural and substantive rules—a topic that exceeds the scope of this paper.
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cially compelling medical conditions.  Some access laws fall mainly into the
second grouping.  “Any-willing-provider”73 and “freedom-of-choice” laws74 usu-
ally apply only to limited types of physicians or licensed professionals, and
continuity-of-care provisions are often limited to patients with special condi-
tions such as pregnancy, terminal illness, or especially severe disease.  Other
access provisions, however, such as “point-of-service” options75 and access to
obstetrician-gynecologists apply more broadly.
The broader versions of these provisions have a weak relationship to market
failure.  The structure and content of managed care networks are among the
core features of managed care and are primary considerations in selecting and
negotiating managed care insurance.  Restricting different types of networks
limits market options and therefore constrains informed consumer choice.
However, these laws respond to the concern that employer selection of insur-
ance limits the choice that individual consumers have and may fail to reflect
workers’ collective preferences.  For instance, one might imagine that single
male business owners might not fully consider some women’s desire to have a
specialist as their primary care physician.  Even in less obvious situations, het-
erogeneity of preference in the workforce precludes any single selection that
satisfies all preferences.
The difficulty with this justification of broad access provisions is that it has
no apparent boundaries.  The logical extension is to prohibit most versions of
managed care and insist only on nearly pure indemnity insurance—a world to
which we cannot and should not return.  A much less intrusive solution is to
require that employers offer workers a greater choice of plans.  Some choice of
plans is offered by larger employers, and the largest firms offer a wide array of
plans.  Expanding choice of plans to small firm workers is a major objective of
some recent congressional proposals.76
Access provisions that are more narrowly tailored to chronic or especially
severe conditions address two different concerns: insurers’ incentive to provide
poor service to those with chronic illness, and healthy consumers’ difficulty ex
ante in knowing their own likely preferences were they to become ill in the
future—in short, the problems of risk adjustment and myopia (or salience).  “I
knew having cancer was frightening, but I did not realize that it would be this
terrifying.”  One response is “that’s too bad.  You made a bad choice.  Better
luck next time.”  However, the political response is more sympathetic, in part
73. These laws require insurers to include in their networks any provider (in the designated
category) who is willing to meet the insurers’ usual payment and contract terms.  See Marsteller et al.,
supra note 2.  We do not include here the version of these laws that applies only to pharmacies.
74. These laws bar an insurer from entirely avoiding one or more designated classes of providers,
such as chiropractors, acupuncturists, or physician assistants.  Id.
75. “Point-of-service” refers to a type of managed care plan that allows patients to seek care
outside the provider network by paying a higher deductible and copayment.  These laws require either
insurers or employers to offer a point-of-service feature, so that purchasers or subscribers are not
forced into a closed HMO system which does not offer any coverage outside its provider network.
76. See Hall et. al. , supra note 50, at 142-44.
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because of the potential that insurers will purposefully limit services for the
highest cost illnesses.
Here, the laws appear to be a reasonably good fit with significant market
failure concerns.  They enact protections that more fully informed and prescient
consumers might likely be willing to pay for and protections that are important
in counteracting the risk selection problems created by regulations limiting
insurers’ ability to fully adjust rates to reflect the health risks of the chronically
ill.  Access to specialists accommodates changes in patient information and
preferences following onset of illness and gives patients options to seek care
from physicians who may have less incentive to skimp on care.  However, this
comes at a cost in terms of reduced ability of health plans to control their
outlays and to direct patients into more effective forms of coordinated care.
4. Mandated Coverage Terms
Coverage laws also fall into two groupings.  One type of law, known as a
mandated benefit, requires coverage for a particular type of service under par-
ticular circumstances, such as an in-patient stay for a mastectomy.  The other
type of law specifies a general coverage standard by defining “medical neces-
sity” or “emergency.”  Mandated benefit laws long preceded patient protection
enactments or even managed care generally, and they are far too numerous to
lend themselves to easy analysis.  Some are justified by classic public goods con-
siderations (for example, coverage of clinical trials), some by collective action
or adverse selection concerns (for example, pregnancy), and some by predict-
able forms of consumer irrationality (for example, mental health).  Others
respond only to private interests of providers or advocacy groups (for example,
coverage of chiropractic care).
There is no particular logic or pattern to the mandated benefits that are
included as part of managed care patient protection laws, other than that they
address the restrictions in coverage that have arisen most recently.  The two
examples we track here—maternity stays and mastectomies—each has a plausi-
ble justification in legitimate market failures.  How strong the justification is
merits further empirical inquiry.  Even if these laws legitimately respond to a
form of market failure, however, they still have the potential to cause other
failures.  Any mandate, by definition, will increase costs and will diminish
choice.  Therefore, mandates require careful individual evaluation, rather than
across-the-board assessment, to determine how well they reflect collective con-
sumer preferences, including willingness to pay for them.
A prudent layperson standard for emergency care likewise relates reasona-
bly well to concerns about consumer myopia and public goods.  The inability to
think clearly and with foresight about health care needs, or to rationally delib-
erate over existing options, is especially acute for emergency conditions.  How-
ever, the market justification is weak for specifying a uniform definition of
medical necessity.  First, this alters or constrains the fundamental terms of cov-
erage that apply across nearly the full range of possible treatment situations.
Second, there is no reason to believe that employers will not accurately repre-
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sent employees’ interests in negotiating these terms, since owners and managers
are covered by the same terms.  Concerns based on heterogeneity of employees’
preferences potentially apply with equal force to any provision of the insurance
contract, but, as discussed above, there are less restrictive solutions than man-
dating contract terms that undermine a core purpose of managed care insur-
ance—namely, to modify the professional standards that developed in response
to inflationary, fee-for-service payment.
The strongest justification for laws defining medical necessity is that they
are a necessary component in creating the external review mechanisms
described above.  Giving more definition to medical necessity could assist this
review process if the contract completely fails to define the term, but this should
be done only as a default provision that parties are free to alter, since the core
purpose of external review should be to enforce the actual terms of the contract.
If external review is to be mandatory, then legal provisions are required to
prevent insurers from undermining this review mechanism by declaring, in
effect, that medical necessity is determined solely by the insurer.  Many medical
necessity definitions, however, appear to go beyond this more limited role.
5. Disclosure and Information Requirements
Missing from this assessment is a discussion of laws that require health plans
to collect and disclose market-enhancing information.  Mandating improved
information flow is usually the first step toward correcting market defects, since
these measures usually have a low cost and thus are directly market-enhancing.
Because disclosure requirements are relatively uncontroversial, and because
they are amply discussed elsewhere,77 they are not included in the main part of
this study.
However, the following points are noted in passing.  First, disclosure alone is
unlikely to solve many of the more serious market defects, since these market
failures are premised on consumers’ inability to fully process the information
they have.  Simply focusing purchasers’ decisions on possible future health
states does not resolve the problem that people cannot accurately project
changes in their preferences and values.  Second, people have limits to the
amount of information they can usefully process in a given transaction, so
adding more information may actually worsen things by distracting people from
what is most important to them.  Finally, the disclosure requirements most
common in patient protection laws primarily address the structuring and
functioning of the health plan.  They do not go to the essence of what
consumers need to know in deciding on the purchase of credence goods—
namely, how well they will likely be cared for in the event of various kinds of
illness.
77. See Mark A. Hall, The Theory and Practice of Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 207 (Autumn 2002); William Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure
Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999).
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6. Overall Assessment
Patient protection laws have the potential to address a number of patient
vulnerabilities created by the market defects identified in the first part of this
article.  Especially potent are liability and external review provisions, access to
specialists for people with serious illness, and protecting physicians’ independ-
ent judgment.  Other provisions respond only weakly to legitimate market
flaws, or appear likely to worsen the proper functioning of health insurance and
health care markets.  Most notable in this category are some benefit mandates,
broad access guarantees, and prescriptions of coverage terms that constrain
contractual flexibility and innovation.
Finally, certain forms of market failure are not addressed at all by patient
protection laws.  Nothing in these laws responds to health plans’ lack of
incentive, created by high turnover rates, to invest in the long-term health of
their members.  Furthermore, these protections deal only indirectly with the
difficulties in anticipating and monitoring the core quality of care.  Protections
come primarily in the form of remedies for breach of obligation and expanded
choice at the time of illness.  However, these ex post protections are in tension
with increased choice at the point of insurance purchase, which is the market’s
primary engine.  Whether, on balance, they work to the advantage of consumers
will depend in large measure on whether patient protections significantly
increase costs and decrease the number of competitors.
C. Regulatory Enforcement
1. The Need for Enforcement
Legal enactments are only as good as the ability to enforce them.  There-
fore, one indication of whether patient protections laws are meant to address
serious market problems, and how capable they are of doing so, is whether suf-
ficient mechanisms and resources are in place for regulatory enforcement.
Some patient protection provisions require no enforcement mechanisms.  Other
provisions require only minimal oversight, such as reviewing insurers’ standard
contract forms to determine that they contain required elements.  However,
other provisions can be expected to have differential impact according to the
enforcement resources made available.
For instance, external review laws can be expected to have a greater impact
if states provide assistance to patients in pursuing these appeals.  Unlike liability
claims, which have some prospect of attracting legal representation on a contin-
gency fee basis, many patients will be unable or unwilling to pay for representa-
tion in appeals that pursue only the monetary value of treatment.  Without rep-
resentation, their appeal rights would not be as effective.  Therefore, a number
of states (eighteen) have created ombudsmen programs to assist consumers with
pursuing these appeals.  However, these laws exist in fewer than half the states
with external review laws.
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Other provisions require additional monitoring and enforcement through
regulatory agencies.  Although patients or providers conceivably could sue for
direct enforcement, only New Mexico explicitly creates a private right of action
in its patient protection law.  Moreover, patients are not likely to notice
violations of some provisions, such as those affecting contractual relationships
between plans and providers, and some violations are not likely to create stakes
that merit legal action, even by providers.  Therefore, insurers might conclude
they can violate some provisions with impunity.  For instance, most states
require insurers to pay legitimate claims within a set time (so-called “prompt
payment laws”),78 but the law attaches no penalty and most claims are too small,
or delays too insignificant, to merit legal action.79  Therefore, several regulators
have issued very large fines for insurers’ repeated violations of these laws.80
This section explores the full extent of regulatory enforcement of patient
protection laws.
2. Description
Managed care regulation occurs through three types of agencies.  Most
commonly (in thirty-nine states), the department that regulates other types of
insurance has primary responsibility.  In ten states, full or substantial authority
is assigned to a division within the health department.  Two states have special
purpose agencies (the California Department of Managed Care and the Florida
Agency for Health Care Administration).  Among insurance departments,
important distinctions include whether the commissioner is appointed or
elected (eight states), and whether the department has a special division or
office devoted to managed care regulation (nine states).  Table 3 reports survey
results on the following five types of enforcement activities conducted by these
agencies.
78. Although these laws were enacted as part of the patient protection provisions, we do not
include them in our study because they so clearly act as provider protections.
79. However, these violations might form the basis for a class action, as is being alleged in the class
action suits against leading HMOs brought by physician organizations in several states.  Tanya Albert,
N.Y. Medical Society Sues Six Insurers, AMER. MED. NEWS, Sept. 3, 2001, at 12; Molly Tschida, Taken
To Task: Florida Docs Sue HMOs for Improper Claims Reimbursement, MODERN PHYSICIAN, Nov. 1,
1998, at 10.
80. Cheryl Jackson, Georgia Makes Them Mind, AM. MED. NEWS, June 18, 2001, at 19.
SLOANHALL_FMT.DOC 10/02/02  1:50 PM
Page 169: Autumn 2002] MARKET FAILURES 199
SLOANHALL_FMT.DOC 10/02/02  1:50 PM
200 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 4
SLOANHALL_FMT.DOC 10/02/02  1:50 PM
Page 169: Autumn 2002] MARKET FAILURES 201
(1) “Increased staff” indicates whether additional staff positions were
created specifically to enforce state patient protection laws.  Positive
responses ranged from five to eight positions in eight states81 to one to
three positions in thirteen states.  Because there is not a high degree of
confidence in the precise number of positions, this tabulation reports
only whether some or no special positions have been created.
(2) “Directives” reports whether the agency has issued directives or bulle-
tins notifying insurers of the requirements of patient protection laws.
Most states have issued only one to two such communications (“few”),
although nine states have issued three or more.
(3) “Investigations” reports whether states have conducted any
investigations or audits to determine insurers’ compliance with these
laws.  Market conduct examinations, audits, and special investigations
were included as long as they focused on patient protection provisions as
defined in this study, but routine follow-up or investigation of individual
consumer complaints were excluded.  Over half the states reported no
such targeted investigations.  The remainder reported anywhere from
two to several dozen.  A few states responded that every insurer is
examined periodically for compliance with all laws, including patient
protection laws.82
(4) “Targeted fines” reports that twenty-three states had issued one or more
fines or penalties against insurers for violations of these particular laws.
Often, such fines were for violation of “prompt payment” laws, which
require insurers to pay or respond to claims within a specified time limit.
In several states, these are the largest fines in recent history against
health insurers for any type of violation, amounting to several hundred
thousand dollars per insurer, and over one million dollars overall.83
Although this study does not specifically address prompt payment laws,
they were included as relevant for purposes of classifying fines since
these laws were enacted in recent years as part of patient protection
packages in many states.
(5) “General fines” reports the size of the state’s highest fine issued against
a health insurer in the past ten years for the violation of any insurance
law, not just patient protection laws.  This item is included based on
interviews that indicate that, if the state has an established regulatory
track record with respect to health insurers generally, that climate of
81. Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, New Mexico, and
Virginia.
82. We believe this may be true in several or many other states.  Regulators may have been unsure
about whether to report routine audits because of how our question was worded.  Therefore, these
numbers likely understate the amount of investigative activity as we attempted to define it.
83. See, e.g., 10 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1409 (2001) ($1.4 million in fines against four Maryland
plans); 10 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1259 (2001) (Texas fines seventeen insurers a total of $9.25 million);
10 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 179 (2001) ($1 million fine against Kaiser in New York); 9 BNA HEALTH L.
REP. 1463 (2001) (Pennsylvania fines three HMOs a total of $400,000).
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scrutiny is likely to carry over to new laws even if they have not yet been
specifically enforced.  Only sixteen states report fining a health insurer
more than $100,000 in the past ten years.
(6) “Enforcement count” reflects the number of categories in which the
state has a positive response.  “Enforcement weight” reports a total
score based on whether the state’s response was high or low, in those
categories where responses were trifurcated.84  As can be seen, states’
enforcement scores range widely, from the lower third averaging about
one, to the upper third averaging over four out of the five categories of
enforcement activity.  This divergence is due to the fact that states in the
extreme terciles tended to be either active or inactive in most categories,
rather than activity patterns being scattered.85  Thus, for instance, states
with newly created staff positions to enforce the law also were much
more likely to have issued several bulletins and to have conducted
targeted investigations or to have issued specific fines.
(7) The two columns relating to “ER violations” contain self-reported
responses to two standardized questions, asking how likely it is that a
violation would be detected, and what the most likely enforcement
response would be, if “a health plan repeatedly was unreasonable in
refusing to pay for emergency room care it thought was not a true
emergency.”  Forty states were confident (“almost certain” or “very
likely”) they would detect this violation, and none thought it “unlikely.”
The probable response in most states (twenty-seven) was to issue a fine.
The majority of the remainder who responded would order that the
practice cease.
Differences in enforcement levels appear logically related to legal and
market factors (Tables 4 and 5).  As expected, enforcement increases according
to the number of laws in each state and the length of time major enactments
have been in place.  Likewise, states with the fewest HMOs have the least
enforcement, in part because these states also have fewer laws.
Also explored was the relationship of enforcement patterns to the structure
of the agency and its enforcement resources and activities in other arenas.
Overall, insurance departments have a higher score than do health departments
(Table 4).86  Among insurance departments, scores are somewhat higher when
the department has a division or office devoted to managed care, yet scores are
84. Weighting is done on a three-point scale (0 to 2), with 1.5 assigned to positive responses in
categories with only two levels of response (none/some).  In most of the following discussion, we use
the weighted scores to reflect the level of enforcement activity.
85. All states with more than two directives and with targeted fines were in the top third in
enforcement scores overall.  All states except three with targeted investigations or with newly created
staff positions were in the top half in overall scores.  States in the lower half or third derived their
enforcement scores primarily from issuing a few bulletins and/or from medium-sized general fines.
86. Enforcement did not differ in insurance departments with elected rather than appointed
commissioners, even though elected commissioners have a reputation for being more consumer-
oriented.
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lowest among health departments, even though in all instances they also have a
separate managed care division.
TABLE 4:







No. of Activities 2.8 3.0 2.2
Mean Activity
Weight 3.9 4.6 3.2
Bold indicates greater than 1/2 point difference from adjacent number.
TABLE 5:







No. of Laws 3.3 3.7 4.7
Years In Effect* 3.0 4.8
HMO Mkt. Share 3.0 4.0 4.7
Agency Budget** 3.7 4.3 3.9
General Examinations** 2.7 4.1 5.0
Agency Staff** 4.5 3.5 3.7
General Fines** 4.4 3.7 3.7
Chance of Detecting ER
Violations* 3.0 3.3 6.0
Likely Response to ER
Violations* 3.3 4.4
Bold indicates greater than 1/2 point difference from adjacent number.
*Categories are used here rather than terciles.  For Years In Effect, states are
divided based on whether first laws were before (high) or after (low) Jan. 1,
1998.  For Chance of Detecting and Likely Response, states are grouped using
the responses shown in Table 3.
**Based only on states with primary enforcement through the insurance
department
Managed care enforcement shows a curious pattern in relationship to
general agency enforcement activities and resources.87  The expected pattern
appears for per capita agency budget and for the number of examinations per
insurer (Table 5).  The lowest states in these measures also had less
enforcement of managed care patient protection laws.  However, the inverse
87. By general, we mean insurance generally, rather than health insurance or managed care.
Therefore, this portion of the analysis pertains only to enforcement by insurance departments, which
have jurisdiction over all types of insurance.
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relationship appears for agency staff and total fines, relative to the number of
insurers in the state.  For these measures, there is more patient protection
enforcement in states with the lowest resources and activity overall, indicating
that managed care enforcement may sometimes receive special or unique
treatment or divert enforcement efforts from other areas.
3. Evaluation
From this survey, it is not possible to determine whether these enforcement
activities are sufficient or excessive.  That determination requires additional
empirical investigation.  However, it appears that states are not neglecting these
laws and that the patterns of enforcement relate to legitimate differences in
legal, market, and agency conditions.  Also, it is noteworthy that enforcement
levels are logically related to differences in states’ self-reports about what would
likely happen in response to a pattern of patient protection violations.  States




This article concludes by reflecting on the broader themes of this sympo-
sium.  Do the market defects identified explain why the managed care revolu-
tion has stalled?  Can patient protection laws help put managed care back on
track, or are they obstacles to meaningful reform?
From a perspective of reliance on market forces to achieve socially desirable
outcomes, the fundamental failure of managed care is the failure to produce
competing systems of health care delivery that force competitive processes and
consumer choice to focus on trade-offs between the cost and the quality of care.
The market has not generated integrated delivery systems that offer
fundamentally different styles of practice and care management, analogous to
the choice in transportation markets among bicycles, motorcycles, Neons, and
BMWs.  The market flaws identified share a large responsibility in this failure.
If consumers cannot effectively identify and evaluate quality/cost trade-offs,
then providers have little incentive to differentiate themselves on this spectrum,
and they lack the information systems needed to determine which limitations in
care are most cost-effective.  Imperfect risk adjustment and high turnover make
it more attractive for insurers to compete based on risk selection techniques
than by improving the fundamental efficiency of care delivery.  Additionally,
employer-based purchasing shields the ultimate consumers of health care from
the true costs, giving rise to chronic dissatisfaction with cost-containment
initiatives.
Few of the patient protection laws address the fundamental sources of these
market flaws.  The exceptions are disclosure requirements, which attempt to
improve consumer information, and some aspects of liability reform, which
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might help to move MCOs toward more truly integrated delivery systems.88
Most of these laws attempt to treat only some of the symptoms of market
defects without curing the disease.  In particular, these laws do nothing about
the source of health plans’ disincentives to invest in long-term health or to
encourage enrollment by people with health problems.
No market functions perfectly, however, and the social and economic dis-
ruptions that would result from curing some of these market defects are not tol-
erable—for instance, eliminating employer-based insurance or allowing insurers
to engage in unconstrained medical underwriting and risk rating.  Therefore,
these laws should not be blamed for failing to solve all of the market’s prob-
lems.
Still, these laws can be faulted for their tendency to suppress the innovation
and variation in medical care delivery that managed competition was meant to
foster.  Under one view of these laws, they are meant to enshrine a one-size-fits-
all model of health insurance in which everyone enjoys a wide choice of provid-
ers, is subject to uniform standards of coverage and care, and is never bothered
by cost-containment mechanisms.  The “backlash” mentality would like to rid
the country of HMOs, or force them back into a traditional indemnity mold.
Recent market trends indicate a move in this direction, with distinctions among
different types of insurance becoming increasingly obscure.
It is too early to conclude, however, that patient protection laws are respon-
sible for these developments.  This requires more in-depth empirical investiga-
tion.  But judging from a surface inspection of these laws and their enforcement,
it appears that they leave substantial room for the development and differentia-
tion of managed care systems.  The provisions that potentially are most threat-
ening to the core attributes of managed care—”any-willing-provider” laws, uni-
form definitions of medical necessity, and restrictions on the use of financial
incentives—are also the provisions that most often are enacted in a weakened
or limited form.
The careful reader may be looking for a final assessment of the overall
desirability of these laws.  This article purposefully eschews any such ultimate
pronouncement, but instead adopts a limited perspective, which describes the
laws in the context of the more important market failures rather than assessing
the “effectiveness” of such laws empirically.  Not only would such an
assessment be premature, but a prerequisite to assessing the effectiveness of a
“reform” is obtaining a firm grip on what such reforms should accomplish.
Further evaluation requires not only more empirical assessment, but also
requires consideration of other perspectives such as political or social theory.
In the social movement that gave rise to patient protection laws, both
market and political processes, and most likely an interaction between the two,
are saying that core features of the first generation of managed care are unde-
88. See Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics Make Bad
Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395, 412-15 (2001); Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for
the Quality of Care, 31 GA. L. REV. 587 (1997).
SLOANHALL_FMT.DOC 10/02/02  1:50 PM
206 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 4
sirable.  By attempting to rehabilitate managed care, these laws create some
hope that the revolution is not in fact “finished” in either sense of the term.  On
the other hand, some aspects of patient protection laws appear to respond pri-
marily to lobbying by special interests, which would prefer to rid the world of
managed care in all forms, and some aspects of the laws appear to have little
practical significance.  On balance, although the laws as enacted to date lack
some important features that could address some of the shortcomings we identi-
fied in the first section of this article and address other concerns that seem to
have less merit from a societal perspective, it is indeed possible that at least
some of these laws are worthwhile. A judgment about this awaits a more in-
depth empirical assessment of the specific effects of these laws.
